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Today i am going to start with my random bitching and move on to more serious topics...
I waited and waited for her to come back... we got a phone call around 7:30 the next day... my mom took the call... the Polk County Sheriffs office called to inform us that Tammy Jo Ruzga was murdered. They wouldn't tell us any details. She had us down as Emergency contacts when she was arrested a few years earlier... My dad picked me up and sat me on the counter... that woman was my best friend and only friend at the time... she took me everywhere... granted they were drug runs but it was still an adventure to go out and see new things when i was little... i didn't know what it was back then... anyways dad put me on the counter, mom was crying... i asked what was wrong with her and dad said that my Aunt Tammy isn't coming over anymore... She is gone and wont come back... We weren't very religious but i knew what heaven and hell was... but they didn't want to promise me where she was going... they just said that she was standing in front of GOD ready for her judgment. I wouldn't believe him. I said " no she promised to come back, where is she!!!" he calmly told me that she was with GOD now and she couldn't hurt anymore... I fought and fought with him... i wouldn't listen to anyone... My brother came home and saw me and mom in tears and ran to me to ask what happened... dad told him and he knew how close i was to her... I was 8 years old... it was just before we had moved...My brother was 16 and he had a lot going on... and wasn't around... Aunt Tammy filled the void he left for so long... When she died I had no one for a long time... My mother and I were not close EVER until about 6 years ago... she didnt really give two shits how i felt then... i was too young to understand she said... I didnt know what really happened until about 5 years ago... But I have found the news paper clippings and legal documents from the court dates and such.
i will now post some of the info i found...
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the
death penalty upon Ronald Jorgenson. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm Jorgenson s first-degree murder conviction but vacate the sentence of death and instead, direct imposition of a sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years. The evidence presented at trial established the following facts. In the early morning hours of December 2, 1993, Jorgenson called the sheriff s office to report that Tammy Jo Ruzga was missing. Ruzga and Jorgenson had been living
together for approximately eight months. Jorgenson told the sheriff s office that Ruzga had left the house the previous evening in his car and had not returned. Hours later, Ruzga was found dead in the car on the side of a road. She had been shot three times in the head. The murder weapon was never found. Shoe prints, tire prints from a second car, and a Camel Light cigarette butt were found near
the murder scene. On the afternoon of December 2, detectives observed shoe prints at Jorgenson's house similar to those found at the murder scene. Jorgenson voluntarily agreed to come to the sheriff s station for an interview. Jorgenson waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily gave the detectives the pair of shoes he was wearing. The detectives also collected several Camel Lights cigarette butts that Jorgenson discarded while at the station. When asked about the previous night,
Jorgenson stated that he was at Rocky Finley s house with Laurie Kilduff. Jorgenson stated that after leaving Finley's house, he and Kilduff stayed at Jorgenson s house the rest of the night.
When interviewed, Kilduff told the same story as Jorgenson, but added that she and Jorgenson had gone out for a drive. Kilduff was interviewed a second time on December 3, again repeating the same story. Detectives analyzed the tires on Kilduff's car at the second interview, to see if they matched those found at the murder scene. After making a positive identification, the police arrested Kilduff
for a previous violation of probation. Detectives confronted Kilduff with evidence which implicated her and Jorgenson in Ruzga s murder. She was warned that she could be charged as a principal for first-degree murder. She was told that it was her last chance to talk, and if she helped out, she would receive complete immunity. Kilduff finally admitted that she was near the murder scene on the night of the murder, that she witnessed Jorgenson shoot Ruzga, and that she drove Jorgenson home.
Kilduff repeated this testimony at trial. Other evidence presented at trial established that both Jorgenson and Ruzga used the drug methamphetamine. Jorgenson was also a dealer of the drug. Witnesses alleged that Ruzga s drug use caused her to lie and steal from Jorgenson, creating friction between the two. A number of witnesses testified that Jorgenson made references to wanting
to kill Ruzga in the weeks before the murder. Several witnesses also testified that Jorgenson discussed the details of the murder with them. State evidence was introduced that linked Jorgenson's saliva to that which was on the cigarette butt found at the murder scene. There was also evidence that the shoe prints found at the murder scene matched Jorgenson's shoes, and the tire prints found at the murder scene matched Kilduff's car. At the end of the guilt phase, the jury found that
Jorgenson was guilty of first-degree murder. During the penalty phase, the State presented one aggravating factor-Jorgenson s prior 1967 conviction for second-degree murder in Colorado. Jorgenson presented two statutory mitigating factors: (1) the murder was committed while Jorgenson was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and (2) Jorgenson s capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. Jorgenson also presented three
nonstatutory mitigating factors which were recognized by the trial court: (1) the murder was committed while Jorgenson was under the influence of drugs, (2) the murder was a product of disagreement stemming from a romantic relationship, and (3) there was disparity of treatment between Jorgenson and Kilduff. Jorgenson alleges in this appeal that he also presented eleven additional nonstatutory mitigators. The jury recommended death by a vote of eleven to one. The trial
court found that the aggravating factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court determined that neither of the statutory mitigating factors nor the second nonstatutory mitigating factor were established. The trial court also determined that the two established nonstatutory mitigating factors only deserved minimal weight. The trial court did not address the eleven nonstatutory mitigating factors that Jorgenson raises in this appeal. The trial court agreed with
the jury s recommendation and imposed the death penalty. Jorgenson raises seven points on appeal. He asserts the following: (1) the trial court erred by denying Jorgenson s motion to suppress
evidence and statements; (2) the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce Additionally, a witness testified that on the evening of the murder, Jorgenson had what appeared to be ketchup on his shirt and appeared to be fidgety. Witnesses testified that Jorgenson often carried a gun. Also, a letter written by Jorgenson to Kilduff, after Jorgenson was in jail pending trial, stated, Without you they don t have a case. (FN3) Jorgenson asserts that he raised the following nonstatutory mitigating factors during the penalty phase: (1) Jorgenson suffered an
impoverished childhood; (2) Jorgenson s childhood was spent as a latchkey kid; (3) Jorgenson dropped out of high school; (4) Jorgenson was raised in a single-parent home with no child support; (5) Jorgenson lived a law-abiding life from 1973 to 1993; (6) Jorgenson was a good and loving father; (7) Jorgenson had a loving relationship with his family; (8) Jorgenson was a good friend to many;
(9) Jorgenson was 54 at the time of sentencing and would not be eligible for parole until he reached the age of 79; (10) none of the aggravating factors of section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1993), apply to the facts of this crime; and (11) Jorgenson is intelligent and the antisocial aspects of his brain damage can be ameliorated in a structured environment, thus allowing Jorgenson to be
rehabilitated and make a positive contribution in prison. *426 evidence of collateral crimes and bad acts; (3) the trial court erred in failing to find that Jorgenson established the alleged mitigating factors; (4) the trial court erred by failing to discount the weight of the previous violent felony aggravating factor based on the facts of the previous felony; (5) the trial court erred by weighing
and allowing the penalty phase jury to weigh the nonstatutory aggravating factor that Jorgenson was a drug dealer; (6) the trial court erred in denying Jorgenson s requested jury instruction regarding the nonstatutory mitigating factor of disparity of treatment of an accomplice, and that the trial court erred in failing to find this mitigating factor; and (7) the death penalty is disproportionate
in this case. We address the two guilt phase issues first. In issue one, Jorgenson argues that the
trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and statements. Jorgenson attempted to
suppress a pair of shoes, statements that he made to the detectives, and items collected from his
home, including clothing, ammunition, and blood samples. Jorgenson signed a consent form, which gave
the sheriff s office permission to perform the searches. Jorgenson also acknowledged in the consent
form that he understood his Miranda rights and that he was waiving those lights. Jorgenson argues
that the voluntariness of the consent to search and the waiver of his Miranda lights was impaired,
due to Jorgenson being under the influence of drugs at the time the consent was given. A
warrantless search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Washington v. State, 653 So.2d
362, 364 (Fla.1994). However, a search will be considered lawful if conducted pursuant to consent
which was given freely and voluntarily. Id.; Norman v. State, 379 So.2d 643, 646 (Fla. 1980). In
Washington, this Court stated: The question of whether a consent is voluntary is a question of fact
to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. [W]here the validity of a search rests on
consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it
was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a
claim of lawful authority. . . . [T]he voluntariness of the consent must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence. 653 So.2d at 364 (quoting Reynolds v. State, 592 So.2d 1082, 1086
(Fla.1992)) (alterations in original). Similarly, the burden of showing that a defendant s
statement was voluntarily made is on the State. Brewer v. State, 386 So.2d 232, 236 (Fla.1980). The
State must establish voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. At the healing on the
motion to suppress, Detective Cospar and Detective Warren testified that Jorgenson did not appear to
be under the influence of any intoxicants at the time he gave the search consents, and waived his
Miranda rights. On cross examination, defense counsel was able to impeach the testimony of Detective
Warren. (FN4) However, Jorgenson did not offer any substantive evidence to establish that he was in
fact under the influence of drugs at the time he gave his consent for the searches and waived his
Miranda rights. Based upon our review of the record, we find that there is competent, substantial
evidence that Jorgenson was not intoxicated at the time he gave his consent for the searches and
waived his Miranda rights. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in its ruling on the
motion to suppress. In issue two, Jorgenson argues that the trial court erred in permitting the
State to introduce evidence of collateral crimes and bad acts. Specifically, Jorgenson argues that
it was impermissible for the State to present evidence regarding Jorgenson s activities as a drug
dealer. Jorgenson contends that the State made his drug dealing a feature of the trial. Jorgenson
also argues that this evidence was not relevant to prove any material issue in this case.
------------ (FN4) In a previous deposition, Detective Warren testified that Jorgenson appeared to
be under the influence of drugs. *427 Drug dealing is not similar to the crime for which Jorgenson
was tried in this case and therefore could not have been admitted under section 90.404(2)(a),
Florida Statutes (1993). (FN5) See Sexton v. State, 697 So.2d 833, 836 (Fla.1997). However, this did
not preclude the evidence from being admitted on a different basis. In Sexton, we addressed the
standard for the admissibility of similar crime and bad act evidence when the evidence is not
similar to the crime committed in the instant case: However, the fact that this evidence was not
admissible under section 90.404(2)(a) does not mean that it was not admissible at all. As we
stated in Williams, 110 So.2d at 659: Our initial premise is the general canon of evidence that any
fact relevant to prove a fact in issue is admissible into evidence unless its admissibility is
precluded by some specific rule of exclusion. Viewing the problem at hand from this perspective, we
begin by thinking in terms of a rule of admissibility as contrasted to a rule of exclusion. Later,
in Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla.1988), we explained: Evidence of other crimes is not
limited to other crimes with similar facts. So-called similar fact crimes are merely a special
application of the general rule that all relevant evidence is admissible unless specifically
excluded by a rule of evidence. The requirement that similar fact crimes contain similar facts to
the charged crime is based on the requirement to show relevancy. This does not bar the
introduction of evidence of other crimes which are factually dissimilar to the charged crime if the
evidence of other crimes is relevant. Thus, section 90.404 is a special limitation governing the
admissibility of similar fact evidence. But if evidence of a defendant s collateral bad acts bears
no logical resemblance to the crime for which the defendant is being tried, then section
90.404(2)(a) does not apply and the general rule in section 90.402 controls. A trial court has
broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence and such a determination will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Heath v. State, 648 So.2d 660, 664 (Fla.1994). 697 So.2d
at 836-37. (FN6) With respect to the evidence that Jorgenson was a drug dealer, we find that
------------ (FN5) Section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1993), entitled Character evidence; when
admissible, states: (1) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY.--Evidence of a person s character or a trait
of his character is inadmissible to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a particular
occasion, except: (a) Character of accused.--Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait. (b) Character of victim.-- 1.
Except as provided in Section 794.022, evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait; or 2. Evidence of a
character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to
rebut evidence that the victim was the aggressor. (c) Character of witness.--Evidence of the
character of a witness, as provided in Sections 90.608-90.610. (2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR
ACTS.-- (a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to
prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence
is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. (b) 1. When the state in a criminal action
intends to offer evidence of other criminal offenses under paragraph (a), no fewer than 10 days
before trial, the state shall furnish to the accused a written statement of the acts or offenses it
intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an indictment or information.
No notice is required for evidence of offenses used for impeachment or on rebuttal. 2. When the
evidence is admitted, the court shall, if requested, charge the jury on the limited purpose for
which the evidence is received and is to be considered. After the close of the evidence, the jury
shall be instructed on the limited purpose for which the evidence was received and that the
defendant cannot be convicted for a charge not included in the indictment or information. (FN6)
Section 90.402, Florida Statutes (1993), entitled Admissibility of relevant evidence, states: All
relevant evidence is admissible, except as provided by law. *428 the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling that this evidence was relevant. A material issue in this trial was Jorgenson s
motive for the alleged murder. The record establishes that Jorgenson was in the business of
delivering and selling methamphetamine, and that Ruzga was regularly used as a delivery person. The
record also establishes that Ruzga had stolen from Jorgenson and that he was angered by Ruzga s
abundant use of methamphetamine. State witness Michael Hughes, a cellmate of Jorgenson s, testified
that after the murder Jorgenson told him about his problems with Ruzga and Ruzga s subsequent
threats to turn Jorgenson in if he were to cut off her drug supply. Hughes also testified that
Jorgenson threatened to get rid of anyone who interfered with his drug business. Thus, the evidence
regarding Jorgenson s drug dealing was relevant to support the State s theory of the motive in this
case. Furthermore, although Jorgenson does not raise this issue, our review of the record indicates
that there was competent, substantial evidence to support Jorgenson s conviction of guilt for
first-degree murder. We next turn to the penalty phase issues. Although Jorgenson raises a number
of penalty phase issues, we find issue seven to be dispositive. Therefore, we decline to address
Jorgenson s other penalty phase issues. In issue seven, Jorgenson argues that the death penalty is
disproportionate in this case. We agree. The State only presented and the trial court only found one
aggravating factor in this case--Jorgenson s 1967 prior conviction for second-degree murder. The
facts of this prior conviction mitigate the weight that a prior violent felony would normally carry.
See Chaky v. State, 651 So.2d 1169, 1173 (Fla.1995) (holding that the death penalty was
disproportionate where the lone aggravator based on a prior violent felony was mitigated by the
facts surrounding the previous crime). The facts of the 1967 conviction, as stated by the Supreme
Court of Colorado, are as follows: Defendant s sister called him on the night of August 25, 1966,
and told him her common law husband, Philip Morgan, had automobile license plates which belonged
to her. She said she had found Morgan at a bar and asked the defendant to help her get the plates
back from him. Defendant and a friend drove out to the bar. Defendant entered and asked Morgan to
return the plates. Morgan refused. Defendant left the bar and went into the parking lot towards his
car. At this time Morgan and defendant s sister came out onto the porch of the bar. Morgan began to
hit the sister. Defendant reached into the car, took out his pistol, and fired a warning shot over
their heads with the hope of frightening Morgan. Morgan jumped off the porch and ran towards
defendant. Defendant testified that Morgan shouted that defendant would have to kill him or be
killed. Thereupon, defendant shot three times and wounded Morgan. According to defendant, Morgan
was still able to reach defendant and fight him for the gun, so defendant fired a fourth and fatal
shot to the head. Witnesses for the People testified that Morgan did not get close enough to
defendant to touch him, and that defendant fired until Morgan dropped. Jorgenson v. People, 174
Colo. 144, 482 P.2d 962, 963 (1971). We also find it significant that Jorgenson did not have any
criminal convictions from the time he was released from prison in 1973 until he was arrested in 1993
for a drug offense and the present crime. Based on the facts surrounding the previous conviction,
the time separating the previous conviction and the present crime, and the mitigating factors that
Jorgenson has presented, we find that the death penalty is disproportionate in this case.
Accordingly, we affirm Jorgenson s conviction for first-degree murder, but we vacate his death
sentence and remand this cause for the imposition of a life sentence without possibility of parole
for twenty-five years. It is so ordered. KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., and
GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur. *429 SHAW, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an
opinion. WELLS, J., concurs as to the conviction and concurs in result only as to the sentence.
SHAW, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I disagree with the conclusion that
Jorgenson s death sentence is disproportionate. Although the trial court found that two nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances were established, it assigned little weight to each. The sole aggravating
circumstance, on the other hand, is extraordinarily weighty. Jorgenson was convicted in 1967 of
second-degree murder for a crime that bears several of the earmarks of the present offense. In the
1967 crime, he fired multiple shots at the victim and ultimately killed him by a gunshot wound to
the head. I note that in the present case he shot the victim in the head three times. This Court has
upheld the death sentence in cases where the sole aggravating circumstance was a prior murder. (FN7)
In the instant case, the weighty aggravator of a prior murder coupled with weak mitigation
adequately supports the trial court s imposition of the death sentence. I would affirm the trial
court s order. ------------ (FN7) See, e.g., Ferrell v. State, 680 So.2d 390 (Fla.1996) (affirming
death sentence where sole aggravator was prior second-degree murder), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 117
S.Ct. 1262, 137 L.Ed.2d 341 (1997); Duncan v. State, 619 So.2d 279 (Fla.1993) (affirming death
sentence where sole aggravator was prior second-degree murder). See also Lindsey v. State, 636 So.2d
1327 (Fla.1994) (affirming both death sentences in double homicide where sole aggravator to support
one of the death sentences was prior second-degree murder).
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1346&dat=19950819&id=MvIvAAAAIBAJ&sjid=k_wDAAAAIBAJ&pg=5010,6087050
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=MPIvAAAAIBAJ&sjid=k_wDAAAAIBAJ&pg=5028,5048450&hl=en
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=MfIvAAAAIBAJ&sjid=k_wDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6747,5527494&hl=en
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=MvIvAAAAIBAJ&sjid=k_wDAAAAIBAJ&pg=5010,6087050&hl=en
are all the news paper articles i have found. I am still doing research to find more information... will update later with more if i have it
im tired... im going to bed now
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